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WHAT IS IP FOR? EXPERIMENTS IN LAY
AND EXPERT PERCEPTIONS
GREGORY N. MANDEL†
INTRODUCTION
The normative justifications for intellectual property (“IP”)
law are richly debated. Some policymakers and experts argue
that intellectual property should serve utilitarian goals, while
others contend that the law should seek to protect natural rights
or expressive ends. Such debates have historically lacked data
concerning how human actors in the IP system actually conceive
of the law. This Essay examines the results of experiments on
the understanding of IP law for two critical components of the IP
system: the public at large and IP attorneys. The results raise
significant concerns about the legitimacy and function of IP law
under any of its traditional justifications.
Regardless of IP law’s policy objectives, how people
understand the law is crucial to the success of the IP system.
This is true both for creators who obtain IP rights and IP
consumers who may be regulated by those rights. From the
consumer perspective, the ease of copying enabled by modern
technological advances means that voluntary compliance is
necessary in order for IP law to significantly achieve its goals,
whether IP law serves consequentialist or deontist ends. This
practical reality may be clearest under a utilitarian approach:
any resources that IP owners have to expend to enforce their
rights will reduce their ex ante incentives to engage in creation,
dissemination, and commercialization in the first instance.
Voluntary user compliance is also critical for natural rights and
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expressive conceptions. Widespread copying will chip away at
owners’ natural rights and will limit the ability of authors and
inventors to express themselves.
In addition to these consumer-oriented effects on the IP
system, probing people’s understanding of IP law also yields
valuable information concerning creators. Again, this insight is
clear for an incentive model: IP law can only incentivize desired
behavior if people know the law or are operating in an
environment where incentives are shaped by the law. Similarly,
if IP law is meant to better enable individuals to express their
personalities and viewpoints, these objectives can only be fully
achieved if individuals have some understanding of the law and
its potential protection. Finally, creators can only enforce their
natural rights if they are aware of them. The relationship
between creators’ understanding and the success of IP law varies
by industry and context, but is an important piece of the puzzle
under any of the IP models.
The results of the experiments discussed here raise critical
questions for the nexus between IP law’s means and ends. The
studies of popular perceptions of IP law reveal that the most
prevalent perception does not align with any of the commonly
accepted bases. Rather, the modal response is that IP law exists
to prevent plagiarism. The study of IP attorneys displays much
greater alignment with an incentivist approach to IP rights.
That being said, even here there is still variation in this
conception and in how IP conceptions align with opinions on the
strength of protection.
The varying conceptions of IP law exposed in these studies
presents challenges both for the ability of the law to function as
desired and for the legitimacy of the IP system. The disconnect
between attorneys who help operate the IP system and lay IP
creators and users who act within it presents fundamental
challenges under each of the traditionally conceived bases.
This Essay develops in three parts. Part I explores the
incentives, natural rights, and expressive bases for IP law as well
as the implications of these bases for creators and users of IP
works. Part II reports the results of several studies on IP
perceptions among lay individuals and IP attorneys. Part III
discusses the implications of the results for the functioning and
the perceived legitimacy of the IP system.
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THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S MEANS
AND ENDS
Theories of Intellectual Property Law

How people understand IP law is crucial to the law’s success
under any of IP law’s traditionally conceived normative bases.1
The IP Clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”
by enacting copyright and patent laws.2 Consistent with this
consequentialist framework, the dominant view of IP law and
policy in the United States, particularly in the copyright and
patent context,3 has generally been that the law exists in order to
This utilitarian incentive
incentivize creative activity.4
perspective has been repeatedly affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court,5 and by experts in both legal and economic
1
Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015
B.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 917–19 (2015); Portions of Section I.A are drawn from this
previous work.
2
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3
This analysis focuses on copyright and patent law because the studies
discussed below are primarily directed to copyright and patent law issues. The
(limited) trademark results are also discussed. Like copyright and patent law,
trademark law is primarily supported based on consequentialist rationales, here to
reduce consumer search costs and potential confusion, and, related, to incentivize
producers to invest in the quality and distinction of their products and services.
ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 765–66 (6th ed. 2012); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of
Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1858–59, 1863 (2007).
4
See Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1328, 1328 (2015) (“The traditional justification for intellectual property (IP) rights
has been utilitarian.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746–51 (2012) (“According to the dominant American
theory of intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on providing
creators with . . . incentive[s] to create artistic, scientific, and technological
works . . . .”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic
purpose of patent law is utilitarian: We grant patents in order to encourage
invention.”).
5
E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (“We
have ‘repeatedly emphasized this . . . concern that patent law not inhibit further
discovery by improperly tying up the future use of’ these building blocks of human
ingenuity.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012))); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305 (“[T]he promise
of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and
discovery.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he grant of exclusive rights [in the IP clause] is intended to encourage the
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fields.6 The rationale for the incentive theory of IP law is that
providing authors and inventors with the potential for IP rights
will induce them to engage in greater innovative activity than
they otherwise would, from the creation to the production to the
commercialization of intellectual works.7
The incentive theory of IP law is fundamentally behavioral.
It is based on the premise that the existence of potential IP
rights will cause human beings to change their actions.8 Under
this perspective, the law can only achieve its desired ends either
if people know the law ex ante or if they operate in a system
designed by others who know the law, such as employees in a
research laboratory. Understanding how people comprehend IP
law is therefore a critical component for studying the efficacy and
efficiency of the law in an incentive framework.9
Though the prevailing conceptual basis for IP law is a
consequentialist incentive theory, other theories of IP rights also
receive support. For example, a number of scholars rely on John
creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’ ”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward
the labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’ ”)
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8)); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies
the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (granting patents and
copyrights “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors”);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright]
monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public . . . .” (internal quotation
mark omitted) (quoting Fox Film Corps. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
6
E.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1750–51 (“The Supreme Court, Congress, and
many legal scholars consider utilitarianism the dominant purpose of American
copyright and patent law.” (footnote omitted)); Burk & Lemley, supra note 4, at 1597
(“While there have been a few theories of patent law based in moral right, reward, or
distributive justice, they are hard to take seriously as explanations for the actual
scope of patent law.” (footnote omitted)); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“Today it is
acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are
appropriately conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law
with the dictates of economic efficiency.”).
7
MERGES ET AL., supra note 3, at 11–17; Christopher A. Cotropia & James
Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 926–
27 (2010).
8
See Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 917–18.
9
See Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property
Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2000 (2011)
(discussing how intellectual property law can influence creativity).
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Locke’s labor theory of property rights and similar concepts to
argue that authors and inventors should hold natural rights in
their creative works.10 This deontological perspective views
individuals as automatically entitled to the fruits of their labor.11
Natural rights theory reasons that a creator is morally entitled to
control the copying and distribution of inventions or artistic
creations produced as a result of the creator’s own labor and
effort.12
Other scholars contend, often based on reasoning from Kant
and Hegel, that IP rights can advance expressive ends.13 Under
this rationale, IP rights should be protected to promote greater
personal
freedom,
human
flourishing,
and
cultural

10
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 33–41
(2011); RICHARD A. SPINELLO & MARIA BOTTIS, A DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (2009); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993); see generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) (discussing Locke’s labor theory as it
relates to IP rights). Some scholarship not only supports the natural rights theory of
IP, but also makes a historical argument that this was an originally understood
basis for such rights in the United States. PAUL D. CLEMENT ET AL., THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 1
(2012) (“[F]rom its inception[,] copyright was seen not merely as a matter of
legislative grace designed to incentivize productive activity, but as a broader
recognition of individuals’ inherent property right in the fruits of their own labor.”);
Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 15501800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001) (“It is my intention, nonetheless, to offer a
modest challenge to the prevailing view that the ideas of the natural rights
philosophers did not influence the early development of patent law.”).
11
MERGES, supra note 10, at 33–41.
12
See Gordon, supra note 10, at 1543 (“[A]ll persons have a duty not to interfere
with the resources others have appropriated or produced by laboring on the common.
This duty is conditional, and is a keystone in the moral justification for property
rights.” (footnote omitted)); Hughes, supra note 10, at 297 (“Locke proposes
that . . . there are enough unclaimed goods so that everyone can appropriate the
objects of his labors without infringing upon goods that have been appropriated by
someone else.”).
13
See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1754–56; Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1894–95 (1987); Hughes, supra note 10, at
330–65.
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development.14 Just as individuals use physical property, such as
homes or clothing, to express their personality,15 an individual’s
intellectual creations may be used in a similar manner.16
Expressive theories of IP law, like the incentive theory, can
only succeed if people are knowledgeable of their rights or
potential rights. The human flourishing and personal freedom
that IP rights in one’s creations may provide can only be
promoted if people are aware of such rights. If creators are
ignorant of their IP rights, there is little that law can do to
advance or protect their expression.
For natural rights conceptions, the link between the ends
sought and knowledge of IP rights is weaker. Creators do not
need to know about potential rights ex ante in order for those
rights to vest in creations of the mind ex post. Even here,
however, knowledge of rights is necessary to achieve protection.
In order to fully defend natural rights, people must know that
they exist. Furthermore, as discussed in more detail in the
following section, how IP users understand the law and operate
within the system will significantly affect the scope of creators’
natural rights.
B.

Lay and Expert Populations

The studies examined here involve two different populations:
lay individuals and IP attorneys. Understanding lay perceptions
of IP rights sheds light on the functioning of the IP system from
several perspectives.
Lay perspectives will most directly
represent the view of many IP users, as well as the perspective of

14

See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 4, at 1754–56; Radin, supra note 13, at 1892;
Hughes, supra note 10, at 330–65.
15
See Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity
in the Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2012).
16
See Fromer, supra note 4, at 1765–81 (discussing how authors and inventors
use their creations to express themselves). Consistent with these alternative notions
of IP rights, several European countries endow authors with certain “moral rights”
in their works. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “European Copyright Code” – Back to First
Principles (With Some Additional Detail), 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 278–80
(2010); ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL
RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 37–47 (2010). These moral rights can include a
right of attribution—requiring that the author of a work be identified—and a right
of integrity—permitting the author of a work to prevent others from distorting the
work in a way that would injure the author’s reputation. Ginsburg, supra, at 278–
80.
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certain creators, jurors, some judges, and various policymakers.
Each of these categories of actors within the IP system is
discussed in turn.17
Public perceptions of IP rights represent the state of mind
for many IP consumers. The ease of copying enabled by modern
technological advances, combined with the high transaction costs
of enforcement, makes widespread voluntary compliance
necessary for the IP system to function as desired under any of
its potential bases.18 Common understanding of IP rights are
critical to IP rights compliance and enforcement in any field that
is characterized by heavy lay use and the inability of owners to
unilaterally control copying behavior.
Lay perceptions also characterize the perspective of a
number of potential IP creators. From an incentive perspective,
and to some extent an expressive one, these perceptions help
shape this population’s decisions concerning what activities to
engage in. Although many potential IP producers will have more
sophisticated knowledge of IP law than the average member of
the public, a substantial pool of creators operate on the basis of
general background knowledge.
This pool includes many
individual creators, who generally do not have sophisticated
knowledge of IP law, but still make substantial contributions to
valuable copyright and patent activity.19 This pool also includes
numerous creators and decision makers at smaller companies,
such as start-up entities and small firms, where individuals often
lack significant expertise in IP law.20 Creative activity within

17

Portions of the following discussion are drawn from Gregory N. Mandel, The
Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261 (2014).
18
See Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A
Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’ L L. & P OL. 219, 224 (1997) (suggesting,
based on experimental research, that gaining voluntary cooperation with the law
will increase the effectiveness of IP law).
19
See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465–66 (2004)
(reporting that a sample of 1,300 U.S. patents included 482 individual inventors and
small entity owners); Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote
Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669,
1711–12 (2009) (discussing a potential increase in size of the “creative class,” made
up of individual artists and authors).
20
See Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN .
L. R EV. 72, 84 (2012) (rejecting the notion that those who operate under the patent
system are all sophisticated concerning the content of patent law).
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these firms is critical to the innovation landscape as research
indicates that smaller firms are responsible for more significant
innovation than larger firms.21
The public perception of IP law also reflects the mindset of
most jurors deciding IP cases. For example, in the initial U.S.
trial in the ongoing Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
litigation,22 it appears that the jury foreman, who is widely
recognized to have played a lead role in the jury deliberation, did
not accurately understand patent law, even after the judge’s
instruction.23
Popular perceptions may also represent the
understanding of some district court judges. Many district court
judges lack expertise in IP law and hear such cases
infrequently.24 For some judges, these issues may be matters of
first impression, and as a result, a more lay understanding of IP
law may play some role in their initial perspective. That being
said, there are certainly other judges, such as those in the Patent
Pilot Program,25 who have far greater knowledge of IP law.
Finally, the public perception of IP is likely to influence and
guide many lawmakers in determining their support for or
opposition to particular IP law proposals. This is true both on an
individual preference level—that is, it is the perception that
many legislators are expected to possess as individuals—as well
as on a representative level because legislators are affected by
the opinions and public discourse surrounding IP debates
21
MERGES, supra note 10, at 210–12; Josh Lerner, The New Financial Thing:
The Origins of Financial Innovations, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (2006).
22
909 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 735 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
23
Mike Masnick, Samsung/Apple Jury Foreman’s Explanation for Verdict
Shows He Doesn’t Understand Prior Art, TECHDIRT (Aug. 30, 2012, 11:32 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120830/02063020214/samsungapple-jury-fore
mans-explanation-verdict-shows-he-doesnt-understand-prior-art.shtml.
For
additional discussion of challenges facing jurors in deciding issues in patent cases,
see Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1411–14,
1439–44 (2006).
24
See THE STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIR.: JUDICIAL BUS. OF THE U. S. COURTS 128–30 (2012), http://www.
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf
(reporting that approximately two percent of district court caseloads involve copyright
and patent cases).
25
Pub. L. No. 111–349, § 1, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); see generally Judge Randall
R. Rader, Addressing the Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent Cases Pilot
Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105 (2013).
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produced by the voting public, media, and general citizenry.
These final effects bring this discussion full circle, as they
indicate that public preferences for IP law will guide even
sophisticated firms’ decision making to some extent. Such firms
will recognize that they operate in an environment where legal
decision making, public policy, and their consumers are all
influenced by the public perception of IP rights.
The nexus between IP attorney perceptions of IP rights and
the functioning of the IP system is more straight forward.
Private attorneys advise their clients about how to operate under
the law. These attorneys’ understanding of the law influences
the counsel that they provide to their clients. In-house IP
attorneys at firms within creative and innovative industries may
play an even more significant role. These attorneys’ beliefs about
IP law help shape their firms’ decisions concerning what creative
activity to engage in and how to protect it under the law.
Therefore, knowing how people understand IP law is necessary to
elucidate how both creators and consumers are expected to
operate under the law.
II. WHAT PEOPLE THINK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IS FOR
A.

Lay Individuals: The Plagiarism Fallacy

To investigate lay perceptions of IP law, Kristina Olson,
Anne Fast, and I conducted a preliminary study exploring
popular opinions on copying creative work product.26 Using
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, we recruited adult
participants located in the United States to take part in the
study. Participants were asked an open-ended question: “In
general, do you think copying someone else’s creative product is
acceptable or not? Why or why not?”27 No reference was made to
IP protection or IP law.
In their responses to whether copying someone else’s creative
product is acceptable, seventy-eight percent of respondents
identified a moral or ethical basis. Only six percent of the
respondents mentioned any legal basis.
The explanations
provided often focused on the concept of copying another’s work

26
27

Portions of Section II.A are drawn from Mandel et al., supra note 1.
Id. at 923.
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as theft, but not from the perspective usually associated with IP
rights. Rather, copying was viewed as theft because it was
perceived as taking credit for another person’s work. Typical
responses in this regard included, “ ‘Copying someone else’s work
and taking credit for it is theft’ and ‘I do not think it is right.
People should give credit where credit is due.’ ”28
This study found that in an abstract context, participants
tended to have a strong, negative reaction to copying another
person’s work. This reaction was rooted in moral and ethical
disapproval of copying, not legal concerns. The moral and ethical
disapproval appeared closely tied to concerns about one person
unduly taking credit for another person’s work.29
A follow-up study focused on the public’s perception of the
basis for IP rights.
Based on the traditionally identified
justifications for IP rights and the results of the first study, we
developed brief descriptions of four potential purposes for IP law:
incentives, natural rights, expressive rights, and protection
against plagiarism. Participants were presented with these
descriptions—in a random order—and were informed that they
were “reasons why someone might support laws regulating the
products of creativity and innovation.”30 Participants, recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website, were asked to “rank
the statements based on how much you agree with them as a
basis for intellectual property law.”31
The results indicate that participants ranked plagiarism
concerns as the leading basis for IP rights more often than any of
the other commonly accepted bases ( 2(3) = 15.655, p = 0.001).32

28
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 929.
Id.
Id. at 931; see infra Table 1.
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Table 1. Lay individual perceived basis for IP rights.
Top Basis

N

Percent

Plagiarism

43

37.1

Incentives

30

25.9

Natural Rights

30

25.9

Expressive

13

11.2

This pair of studies lend significant support to what we
dubbed the “plagiarism fallacy”: That the popular perception of
IP rights is that they are designed to prevent plagiarism, not to
provide incentives or to protect creators’ natural or expressive
rights. As discussed in Part III, the plagiarism fallacy in lay
perception has significant implications for IP law and policy.
B.

Intellectual Property Law Attorneys

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Maggie Wittlin, and I are
conducting a separate series of experiments on IP law attorneys’
attitudes towards IP rights and what motivates such attorneys to
have particular positions about IP rights. The participant pool
was generated from practicing IP attorneys listed on
Martindale,33 or on the websites of the top IP law firms as
determined by Vault34 or U.S. News & World Reports.35 One
hundred thirty IP attorneys throughout the United States took
part in this study.
One question in the study queried the attorneys’ perceived
basis for IP rights. Answer options included descriptions based
on incentives, natural rights, expression, and antiplagiarism
rationales. In addition to the justifications used in the public

33

Intellectual Property Lawyers by State in United States, MARTINDALE, http://
www.martindale.com/intellectual-property/united-states-lawyers-states.htm (last
visited Dec. 19, 2016).
34
2015 Best Law Firms for Intellectual Property, VAULT, http://www.vault.com/
company-rankings/law/best-law-firms-in-each-practice-area?sRankID=20&rYear=
2015 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
35
Best Law Firms for Litigation – Intellectual Property, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT,
http://bestlawfirms.usnews.com/search.aspx?practice_area_id=55
(last
visited Dec. 19, 2016).
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perception study, an additional option, “There is no good
explanation for having IP rights and laws,” was included in this
survey.36 The results from the IP justification question are
displayed in Table 2. The results show that IP attorneys’
perceptions of IP law differ significantly from those of the lay
public.
Table 2. IP attorney perceived basis for IP rights.
Basis

N

Percent

Incentives

101

82.8

Natural Rights

10

8.2

Plagiarism

10

8.2

None

1

0.8

Expressive

0

0.0

IP attorneys overwhelmingly view IP rights as designed to
serve incentive objectives. This is not entirely surprising. As
discussed above, this is the dominant view of IP rights espoused
by the United States Supreme Court and by IP experts.37 It
appears that as individuals go through the process of learning
about and practicing IP law, they come to believe in the
incentives justification. That being said, even for individuals
who had been practicing law for some time, a small group still
believe in the natural rights and plagiarism bases.
Attorneys’ perceptions about the proper basis for IP rights
correlated with their beliefs about how strong IP protection
should be. Those attorneys who perceived an incentives basis for
IP rights believed that patent rights should be stronger than
those who perceived a natural rights or plagiarism basis. Those
attorneys who perceived a plagiarism basis for IP rights believed
that copyright rights and trademark rights should be stronger
than those who perceived an incentives or natural rights basis.

36

There was also an option for “Another reason,” which seven participants
selected.
37
See supra text accompanying notes 1–7.
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The results indicate that the incentive basis for IP rights can
function for sophisticated parties, that is, parties who have
access to IP attorneys. To the extent such attorneys are
consulted, they are likely to advise their clients consistent with
this consequentialist rationale for the law. On the other hand,
the results also indicate that the expressive and natural rights
bases will have a particularly hard time functioning as accurate
drivers of IP rights in the real world. The implications of the
study results for the operation of IP law are the topic of Part III.
III. HOW POSITIVE PERSPECTIVES AFFECT NORMATIVE
PREFERENCES
Both popular and attorney perceptions of IP rights can have
significant effects on how IP rights function in the world and on
the perceived legitimacy of IP law. These effects are explored in
the following sections.38
A.

Popular Preferences for Weaker Intellectual Property Rights

Understanding the popularly perceived justification for IP
rights only tells part of the story about how the law plays out in
society. It is also important to comprehend how individuals react
to potential IP rights in particular instances, regardless of the
perceived basis for the rights. Olson, Fast, and I conducted a
third study that provided a more detailed examination of
individual perceptions of and preferences for IP rights in specific
contexts. This study used vignettes to test six different fields of
potential IP rights: medicine, electronics, software, books, music,
and painting.39 Each vignette described a scenario depicting one
person copying another person’s idea, expression of an idea, or
completed creative product. Four hundred forty-three adults
located in the United States took part in this study, again
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Forty percent
were female and the age range of participants was nineteen to
seventy-eight years old (Mage = 33.84, SD = 12.08).

38

Portions of Part III are drawn from Mandel et al., supra note 1.
Id. at 934. The subject matters tested thus explored various areas of
copyrightable and patentable works, but did not explore trademark protection.
39
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The results revealed that the general public tends to believe
that IP laws are too strong. Across scenarios, participants
believed that copying should be allowed to a greater extent than
they believed IP law permits and to a greater extent than the law
actually provides.40
The disconnect between public preferences and IP law can be
seen by examining participant responses across the
idea/expression divide.
The studies tested whether people
believe that ideas themselves, the expression of ideas, or
complete creative products should be protected by IP rights.
Unsurprisingly, we found that participants viewed it as most
acceptable to copy an idea, followed by the expression of an idea,
followed by copying the complete creative product. Perhaps more
surprisingly, although a significant majority of respondents in
every subject matter believed that copying of ideas should be
permissible, responses to the expression conditions were more
mixed. Though IP law would prohibit copying in each of the
tested expression conditions, a majority of respondents believed
that copying should be permitted in four of the six expression
scenarios. These scenarios included copiers who duplicated the
chorus, additional lyrics, and some of the melody from a song;
painted their own picture of an artist’s collage; used a new
process to copy a patented vaccine; and reverse engineered and
copied a patented semiconductor chip.
Summing across
scenarios, a slight majority of respondents thought that copying
of expression should be permitted in general.
Even in the scenarios involving complete duplication of a
creative product, the public was not always supportive of IP
rights. In one of the six scenarios, the majority of respondents
believed that copying should be permitted, and in two other
scenarios only a slight majority of respondents favored
prohibiting copying. Overall, we found that the public believes
there should be weaker IP protection than the law provides. We
also found that popular preferences are highly context
dependent, varying significantly across different subject matter
domains.

40

Id. at 937.
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The Plagiarism Fallacy in Intellectual Property Law

In addition to the conditions described above, Olson, Fast,
and I also tested a variety of potentially mitigating
circumstances.
For example, we investigated whether
participants believed that copying should be permitted if the
copier provided attribution to the original creator in relation to
making an unauthorized copy. While attribution is never a
defense under IP law,41 attribution would mitigate plagiarism
concerns.
The results revealed a significant effect for attribution in all
six of the subject matters tested. Summing across vignettes,
nearly two-thirds of the population believed that providing
proper attribution to creators should enable the free copying of
their IP works and inventions.42
The public’s perception of the importance of attribution in
copying permissibility is consistent with other research reporting
that creators of intellectual works highly value the right of
attribution. For instance, in a series of experiments, Christopher
Jon Sprigman, Christopher Buccafusco, and Zachary Burns
found that IP “creators are willing to sacrifice significant
economic payments in favor of receiving attribution for their
work.”43 Similarly, Jessica Silbey conducted a series of in-depth
interviews with a variety of people involved in the creative
process and found that concerns about proper attribution and
credit were pervasive.44 Collectively, these studies suggest that

41

Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d
Cir. 1998). Nonattribution in the form of a disclaimer of any relationship with a
referenced author could sometimes provide a defense to copyright infringement. For
example, in a lawsuit for copyright infringement in a case involving a trivia book
about the television show Seinfeld, the trivia book included the proviso that it “has
not been approved or licensed by any entity involved in creating or producing
Seinfeld.” Id. at 136. The court held that this was not enough to negate the factors
militating against a finding of fair use in the particular case but left open the
possibility that such a disclaimer could be relevant in a closer case. Id. at 141–46.
42
Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 950.
43
Christopher Jon Sprigman et al., What’s a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests
of the Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389, 1390
(2013).
44
See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS,
AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015).
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there is a significant disconnect between how IP law treats
attribution—or fails to treat it—and how creators and the
general public understand attribution and IP rights.
These attribution results are contrary to current law. A
legal rule permitting attribution to defeat infringement liability
would essentially eviscerate IP protection. Such a doctrine would
mean that one could freely copy another’s copyrighted work or
patented invention simply by providing appropriate source credit
to the actual creator. An attribution defense would effectively
replace copyright and patent law with law that simply prohibits
plagiarism. The majority of the public appears to favor such a
practice, at least when queried about the permissibility of
copying behavior in a factual context.
Exposing the plagiarism fallacy in IP law helps elucidate a
variety of previously puzzling common behaviors. For example,
millions of YouTube videos state, “no copyright intended” or “no
copyright infringement intended,” in a legally misguided belief
that such disclaimers provide protection against copyright
infringement.45
The entry for “no copyright infringement
intended” in the Urban Dictionary reads, “A phrase put in the
title and/or description section of youtube [sic] videos by
incredibly stupid people who don’t understand how copyright
laws actually work.”46 These disclaimers provide no protection
doctrinally, and therefore may not appear to make sense, but
they are logical if one believes that IP rights are directed at
prohibiting plagiarism.
The plagiarism fallacy also likely helps to explain the
apparent widespread failure of IP owners’ warnings and threats
concerning IP infringement.47
Despite a proliferation of

45
This data was gathered by performing a search on YouTube with the phrase
“no copyright intended” and “no copyright infringement intended.” No Copyright
Intended, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=no+copyright+
intended (last visited Dec. 19, 2016); No Copyright Infringement Intended, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=no+copyright+infringement+intende
d (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
46
No Copyright Intended, URBAN DICTIONARY (Dec. 12, 2009), http://www.urban
dictionary.com/define.php?term=No+copyright+infringement+intended&defid=4431
901 (last visited Dec. 19, 2016).
47
Jenna Wortham, The Unrepentant Bootlegger, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/technology/the-unrepentant-bootlegger.html;
Ernesto Van der Sar, RIAA Warns 1 Million Copyright Infringers a Year,
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campaigns declaring, “infringement is theft” and “copyright
violations are theft,” a substantial amount of infringing activity
continues.48 This disconnect may exist because the popular
understanding of these phrases is different from IP owners’
intended meaning. Since the most common perception for the
basis of IP law is antiplagiarism, many people likely view such
proclamations as a basic declaration that one should not copy
another person’s expression without attribution. Thus, the
average member of the public may agree with the statements
verbatim, but the campaigns do not convey their intended
meaning because the public has a different understanding of the
word “theft” when used in such slogans.
More broadly, the plagiarism fallacy findings shed new light
on the common perception that the public tends to be ethically
dismissive or indifferent towards IP rights.
Instead, this
research indicates that experts have failed to comprehend how
the public actually perceives IP law. Understanding how the
public perceives IP is critical not only for explaining user
behavior, but also for understanding how the wide variety of
creators who are unknowledgeable about IP law may react under
the IP system.
C.

The Legitimacy of Intellectual Property Law

The public’s preferences for weaker and different IP law
creates challenges not only for achieving the socially desired
objectives of the law, but also for the legitimacy of the law.
Widespread disagreement with the substance of a law
undermines its perceived legitimacy.49 Where laws are not
perceived as legitimate, they are less likely to affect citizen
behavior and less likely to achieve their desired goals.50
TORRENTFREAK (July 4, 2010), https://torrentfreak.com/riaa-warns-1-million-copy
right-infringers-a-year-100704.
48
Peter J. Karol, Hey, He Stole My Copyright! Putting Theft on Trial in the
Tenenbaum Copyright Case, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 887, 889–90 (2013); Donald P.
Harris, The New Prohibition: A Look at the Copyright Wars Through the Lens of
Alcohol Prohibition, 80 TENN. L. REV. 101, 103, 138–39 (2013).
49
Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57
A NN. R EV . P SYCHOL. 375, 380–82 (2006); John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante
Function of the Criminal Law, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 165, 183 (2001); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 45–46, 64 (2006).
50
E.g., Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has
Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence
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Popular legitimacy appears to be a particular challenge for
IP law because there are disconnects both concerning lay
perceptions of the basis for the law and, relatedly, concerning the
strength of protection provided by the law. The gap between
public perception and the law raises questions concerning
whether providing greater education about IP law could change
people’s perceptions and consequently improve both the function
and the legitimacy of the law. The evidence is to the contrary.
First, despite the proliferation of advertisements and
warnings through a variety of media seeking to encourage
respect for IP rights and reminding users of potentially strict
penalties for illegal infringement, widespread infringing behavior
continues.51
Second, though there appears to have been a recent rise in
attention to IP, the general public retains an extremely low level
of knowledge about the law. On average, the national sample of
United States adults in our vignette study discussed above
correctly answered only one-and-a-half questions better than
chance on a basic ten question IP law quiz.52 This lack of
knowledge about IP rights alone raises challenges for the law.53
Equally important for our purposes, study participants’
knowledge of IP law did not affect their opinions about what the
law should be.54
Both high-knowledge and low-knowledge
individuals similarly believed that IP law should be weaker than
it currently is. This result is consistent with other studies that
have found that people generally do not distinguish between
what the law is and what they believe it should be.55
Theory, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 347, 367–68 (2009) (discussing lack of support for the
theory that changes in the law produces corresponding changes in behavior, based
on data concerning citizens’ perceptions of marijuana possession legal penalties);
Tyler, supra note 49, at 45–46, 64 (finding that people’s willingness to comply with
the law is related to the perceived legitimacy of the law).
51
Karol, supra note 48, at 889–90; Harris, supra, note 48, at 103; cf. Howard
Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1194–95 (1994) (examining the psychological limitations of the effectiveness of
product warnings in the tort context).
52
Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 960.
53
See, e.g., MacCoun et al., supra note 50, at 347–48 (explaining that marijuana
prohibition laws cannot be effective deterrents if the public is unaware of them).
54
Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 972.
55
See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1410 (2005)
(finding a correlation between people’s views about compliance with laws and their
views about whether the laws were just); Tyler, supra note 49, at 45–46, 64 (finding
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In a related vein, participants reported extremely limited
experience with IP. Only five percent of the study respondents
identified having any experience working in connection with IP
law and just six percent of respondents reported having
“any . . . current or past experience in connection with
intellectual property rights.”56 In reality, however, considering
that the study platform was Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, “most
participants were presumably regular internet users and very
likely had ‘experience in connection with intellectual property
rights’ almost daily.”57 Awareness of this interaction, however,
like their knowledge of IP rights, was extremely limited.
Third, in our most recent series of experiments, Olson, Fast,
and I directly tested the ability of information to affect lay
individuals’ perceptions about the basis for IP rights.58
Participants read one of six arguments about the justification for
IP protection. These justifications included incentives, natural
rights, expressive rights, plagiarism, commons, and a control
group—no argument. We ran the experiment in two different
formats.
The first format involved short, one-paragraph
descriptions of the justifications; the second involved extensive
descriptions and defenses of the justifications that drew on
references to the Constitution, famous historical creators—
Thomas Edison and Mark Twain—and current IP issues.
Approximately six hundred adults located in the United States
and recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk took part in
this study.59
The results are nuanced. In general, participants were not
responsive to any of the traditional justifications for IP rights.
That is, participants who read the incentives, natural rights, or
expressive rights descriptions did not tend to have different
responses from those in the control group or from those who read

that people’s perceptions of the legitimacy of law is greater when the law is
consistent with people’s beliefs about what the law should be); see also Christopher
Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 77, 96–100 (2013) (finding mixed results for the relationship between
compliance and belief in laws being just).
56
Mandel et al., supra note 1, at 960 (alteration in original).
57
Id.
58
Anne A. Fast et al., Experimental Investigations on the Basis for Intellectual
Property Rights, 40 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 458, 458 (2016).
59
Id. at 461, 466.
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a different one of these descriptions. This was true both with
respect to general IP rights questions and to questions about
rights in specific IP contexts. On the other hand, participants in
the commons condition, and to a lesser extent participants in the
plagiarism condition, tended to become less supportive of IP
protection than those in the incentives, natural rights, expressive
rights, and control conditions.60 In other words, arguments about
the justification for IP rights appeared to display a one-way
ratchet; they could convince participants that rights should be
weaker, but not that rights should be stronger.
Though the ecological validity of such experiments is always
a question, this study indicates that IP law will continue to face
significant legitimacy challenges under any of its traditionally
conceived justifications. Even with extensive explanations of
incentive, natural rights, and expressive rationales for IP rights,
people did not tend to change their opinions about the law. In
the real world, it is unlikely that even this strong an information
campaign could be implemented, indicating that the gap between
popular preferences and IP law will likely remain.
CONCLUSION
The studies on lay and IP attorney perceptions of IP rights
paint a daunting picture of the nexus between IP law’s means
and ends for each of its traditional policy justifications. An
incentives basis for IP law may be able to function relatively well
for sophisticated parties in fields where IP owners can
unilaterally control copying behavior to a significant degree.
Fields fitting this profile may include the pharmaceutical
industry, the semiconductor industry, and the theater-run
motion picture industry. In other contexts, the incentives basis
appears to be significantly checked. The natural rights and
expressive bases for IP rights are likely even more challenged
and can only succeed in very limited circumstances. With few IP
attorneys or lay individuals believing in such perspectives, it is
unlikely that many creators or consumers operate under such
conceptions. While IP law may still be enacted consistent with
these principles, such rationales are unlikely to affect behavior or
produce the accurate enforcement of IP rights.
Finally,

60

Id.
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challenges to the legitimacy of IP law are likely to continue as
long as the law is modeled on conceptions that are not widely
shared.

